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　After World War II, Japan adopted a Peace 
Constitution with its Article 9 interpreted as 
legally banning the use of armed force for set-
tling international disputes.  Under this consti-
tution, Japan began to pursue non-violent ap-
proaches to its defense policy with reliance on 
the United States. 
　The end of the Cold War and the collapse 
of the Soviet Union as well as the attack of 
September 11, 2001 in New York changed the 
international landscape dramatically. Under 
such circumstances, Japan’s military forces, 
the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) participated in 
the coalition led by the United States in the 
2003 Iraq War. In 2007, the Defense Agency 
changed its name to the Ministry of Defense 
(MOD). At the same time, international peace 
cooperation activities, which had been origi-
nally supplementary missions, became the pri-
mary activity of the SDF, whose role since 
then has diversified in response to emerging 
new threats and a wide variety of situations. 
　This March, two Maritime Self-Defense 
Forces (MSDF) destroyers left Japan for an 
anti-piracy mission off the coast of Somalia. In 
the process of this decision-making, the pro-
tection of foreign vessels and the use of weap-
ons had been discussed. The Japanese govern-
ment based the MSDF dispatch on the 
existing maritime securities operations frame-
work under the SDF law. However, this law 
restricts MSDF members to protect only Jap-
anese ships and those carrying Japanese na-
tionals or cargo, and to use their weapons 
only in self-defense or in acts of necessity. 
Last month, Hillary Clinton, in Tokyo on her 
first overseas trip as Secretary of State, asked 
the Defense Minister, Yasukazu Hamada to 
allow the MSDF to protect all foreign vessels 
in an emergency.
　On her request, the Japanese Cabinet ap-
proved a bill “concerning punishment and 
measures against piracy,” which would enable 
MSDF personnel to protect all vessels. After 
the Diet passes this new anti-piracy law, it 
will be used as the basis for the MSDF dis-
patch off Somalia. However, because of Japan’s 
pacifist constitution and the Democratic Party 
of Japan (DPJ), the largest opposition party, 
which does not support this bill, it is unclear 
how Diet deliberations will fare concerning 
this legislation. That is why the duration of 
the MSDF mission within the maritime secu-
rities operations framework is limited until 
the Defense Minister issues a new order.
　From this, two issues arise; one is pressure, 
rather than a simple request from the United 
States and the other is the legality and effica-
cy of the use of force in international situa-
tions. Both have always been the main issues 
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in the arguments concerning the dispatch of 
the SDF abroad.  
　The 1991 Gulf War was a watershed in the 
history of post-war Japanese debates on de-
fense and national security, as well as the 
flight of the Taep’odong missile over Japanese 
territory in August 1998.
　In my presentation1, I will attempt to argue 
that by illustrating the evolution of Japan’s re-
cent security practices and by examining its 
security identity, there is a possibility of EU-
Japan cooperation in the area of international 
security. 
1　The Evolution of Japan’s Security Policy
　In terms of Japanese security practices, a 
series of shifts in its policy present a contrast 
between a hamstrung Diet unable to dispatch 
troops for the 1991 Iraq War, and the SDF 
participation in the coalition led by the United 
States in the 2003 Iraq War. By that time, the 
SDF had been dispatched to fourteen coun-
tries or areas. Now, nearly 30, 000 SDF mem-
bers are engaged in twenty international 
peace cooperation activities.
　The involvement of the SDF in the United 
Nations Peacekeeping  Operations (UN PKO) 
in the post-September 11 period, including its 
first participation in an active combat opera-
tion (though not in an active military role) in 
1992―first the Maritime Self-Defense Forces 
in the Indian Ocean in support of the U.S.-led 
coalition operations in Afghanistan in late 
2001, and next the three combined services in 
support of the U.S. operations in Iraq in 2004. 
So-called emergency legislation was passed to 
allow the SDF to operate domestically under 
a legal framework in times of conflict. It also 
has expanded its defense cooperation and 
training with the U. S. military in other areas, 
reflected in new defense guidelines issued in 
1997 and other areas of increased cooperation 
in response to the global war on terrorism. 
New agreements with the United States fur-
ther integrated the capabilities and interoper-
ability of military forces of both states. Japan’
s military capabilities and future weapons de-
velopment also expanded in this period.  
　Perhaps the most dramatic event has been 
the fact that the Japan Defense Agency (JDA) 
was elevated to a ministry, the Ministry of 
Defense, in January 2007. We have to remem-
ber that during the first few months of the 
Persian Gulf Crisis, the then-Prime Minister 
Toshiki Kaifu excluded the JDA from all Cabi-
net deliberations in order to prevent civilian 
decision-making from becoming contaminated 
by the views of professional military leaders.2
　There is no doubt that both the tone of the 
discussions and the content of Japan’s securi-
ty policies have shifted considerably since the 
Cold War and early post-Cold War periods. 
Shortly after the North Korean Taep’odong’s 
missile flight over Japanese territory in Au-
gust 1998, a series of policy outcomes were 
enacted: plans to develop missile defense and 
surveillance satellites, relax arms export re-
strictions; legislation, enacting some contro-
versial aspects of the 1977-revised U.S.-Japan 
Defense Guidelines; and establishing constitu-
tional research commissions in both houses of 
the Diet so as to devise concrete proposals for 
possible revision of Article 9 and other limits 
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on Japanese military activities. 
　Moreover, a number of pieces of domestic 
legislation, suggesting an increasing accept-
ance of symbols and actions of the state, were 
also passed after years of debate, including le-
galizing the long-controversial national an-
them （Kimigayo）and national flag（Hi�
nomaru）, requiring them to be utilized in 
schools, and the approval of wiretapping to be 
carried out by the national police agency 
(NPA)-sparkling off concerns at home and 
abroad over a rising nationalism in Japan. 
a)  The Gulf War As a Watershed
　After the end of World War II, the Japanese 
government established and pursued a funda-
mental national doctrine of maintaining the 
Japan-US security alliance and gaining eco-
nomic prosperity under the Peace Constitu-
tion. In other words, Japan adopted and pur-
sued the so-called “Yoshida Doctrine,” which 
is referred to as the cheap ride of democratic 
Japan after 1945 in Richard Samuels’ book.3 
Since then, for a half century, this so-called 
doctrine has been underpinned by the three 
embedded values of; 1) pacifism, 2) nuclear al-
lergy, and 3) ‘defensive-defense doctrine.’4
　Just shortly after the end of the Cold War, 
it was quite natural for Japan and the U.S. to 
sum up such a new key role of Japan-U.S. alli-
ance relationship as a credible deterrent to 
unspecified threats, because basically no ma-
jor military threat to the Japan-U.S. alliance 
had clearly emerged up till then. Prime Minis-
ter Kaifu envisioned, at that time, that Japan 
would assume a more active global role as a 
non-military, civilian power concentrating on 
economic and environmental issues.  
　In August 1990, Saddam Hussein’s invasion 
of Kuwait and the subsequent military con-
frontation between the United States and Iraq 
came as a complete surprise to Japan, which 
was, then, heavily dependent on oil from the 
Persian Gulf and therefore, came under great 
pressure from the United States. Kaifu, how-
ever, was less inclined to take an active role 
in the crisis. Public opinion showed that most 
Japanese preferred diplomatic negotiations 
and economic sanctions to the use of arms. 
American analysts have frequently argued 
that the Japanese behavior in the Persian Gulf 
Crisis had to be understood as an extension of 
its traditional strategy of free-riding on inter-
national security orders, created by the Unit-
ed States during the Cold War. 
　The Japanese government began to build 
up a domestic political consensus for a more 
active role in international security affairs. In 
order to clear the humiliation of being regard-
ed as “a free-riding Japan,” Kaifu, encouraged 
by public opinion, attempted to rally parlia-
mentary support so as to pass a law, permit-
ting non-military SDF missions abroad.  After 
the Gulf War, Japan started participating in 
UN-sponsored peacekeeping missions though 
most Japanese remained highly ambivalent 
about the use of force in foreign policy. Ac-
cording to a December 1993 survey, only 26% 
of the Japanese respondents indicated that 
the use of force in the maintenance of interna-
tional justice and order was an appropriate 
measure.
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b)  The Impact of the Taep’odong Missile 
Flight over Japan
　On August 31, 1998, the Democratic People’
s Republic of Korea (DPRK) launched a mis-
sile, Taep’odong I, over the main Japanese is-
land of Honshu, which then splashed down 
into the Pacific Ocean. Although the missile 
was tracked by a Japanese Aegis destroyer, 
the flight reinforced the perception that Japan 
would be defenseless in a ballistic missile at-
tack, leading to new perceptions such as the 
deployment of domestically-controlled surveil-
lance satellites and the development of a bal-
listic missile defense (BMD) system. 
　Undoubtedly, the North Korean action was 
a provocation against Japan, particularly be-
cause of its launch, without prior notification, 
in the direction of the sea surrounding Japan, 
where there was heavy sea traffic and many 
fishing boats. Furthermore, the missile flew in 
air space, where there was equally heavy traf-
fic and this naturally posed a problem judging 
from the basic principles of safety, according 
to the International Civil Aviation Treaty. 
　Just one week later, the Japanese govern-
ment and the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) 
“liaison council” began to investigate the op-
tion of acquiring multi-purpose satellites. And 
the newly-established Government Commit-
teee for the Promotion of the Introduction of 
Reconnaissance Satellites (whose Chairman 
was the Chief Cabinet Minister) decided to re-
quest the Ministry of Finance for 80 billion 
yen ( $800 million) as the budget for FY2000 
so as to develop and construct ground-based 
facilities, and train operational experts neces-
sary for the introduction of reconnaissance 
satellites. The government also proposed to 
put four of these into operation from FY2002. 
　At the same time, the Defense Agency (now 
the MOD), too, decided to request 2.1 billion 
yen ( $21 million) as the budget for the BMD 
system. Currently, the Japanese government 
has, in FY2008, allocated approximately 113 
billion yen ( $11.3 billion) for BMD-related de-
fense spending. The Japanese government 
concluded an agreement of co-research and 
co-development of BMD with the U.S. govern-
ment in 2003, as it was the only foreign par-
ticipant in this massively complex and expen-
sive undertaking, one that absorbed more 
than 2 % of the Japanese defense budget in 
2004.  The launches, without prior notification 
of Taep’odong I in 1998 and Taep’odong II in 
July 2006 by the DPRK, had largely contribut-
ed to this fivefold increase in BMD-related 
spending in Japan and the deployment of re-
connaissance satellites as well.5
　Apart from this, most Japanese perceived 
that their country was being coerced by the 
DPRK, and since the 1998 missile tests the 
Japanese public has come to accept the fact 
that war is an ever-present possibility even 
for a civilian power. And this awareness has 
provided the grounds, on which the issue of 
constitutional revision and even nuclearization 
are debated.6
2　Strengthening Japan-US Security Ties
　Throughout the Cold War, Japan was the 
only country that had adopted a Peace Consti-
tution with its famous Article 9 interpreted as 
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legally banning the use of armed force in the 
defense of national objectives. Its professional 
military had little public standing and was un-
der the thumb of civilians, with its grand 
strategy aimed at gaining prestige as a civil-
ian power.
　To be sure, since the 1970s the U.S. govern-
ment has persistently pressured Japan to play 
a larger regional role in Asia and to spend 
more of its rapidly growing GDP on national 
defense. However, Japan has made no more 
than marginal concessions. On security issues, 
it has kept a low regional profile, and since 
the 1980s Japanese defense spending has con-
sistently stayed below 1 percent of its GDP. 
After the end of the Cold War, the United 
States no longer had any multilateral security 
structure in North-East Asia. Therefore, the 
Japanese government was forced to rearrange 
its own defense and security policies in a do-
mestic context.
a)  A New Defense Guideline and Missile 
Defense7
　In the meantime, the U.S. Department of 
Defense published a Security Strategy Docu-
ment (the so-called Nye Report) in 1995 for 
the redefinition of the alliance relationship be-
tween the U.S. and Japan. In this report, the 
need was stressed to redefine the significance 
of the U.S.-Japan security alliance in order to 
meet jointly the new challenges in the area, 
continue to pursue the forward defense pos-
ture in the region, and to maintain the pres-
ence of significant numbers of U.S. troops: 
47,000 in Japan. The Nye Report officially re-
versed the trend towards lower troop levels 
in the immediate post-Cold War period and 
set the U.S. on a course towards seeking and 
consolidating military accessibility in South-
East Asia, and expanding the range of mili-
tary activity covered by the U.S.-Japan Secu-
rity Treaty
　As a result of many years of very extensive 
consultations, both governments finally pub-
lished a joint document, placing an emphasis 
on the continuous significance of an alliance 
relationship between both states, and in April 
1996, “The U.S.-Japan Joint Declaration on Se-
curity,” was issued by President Clinton and 
Prime Minister Hashimoto. 
　Japan finally chose to continue to pursue 
the maintenance and strengthening of U.S.-Ja-
pan security ties. Without any strong objec-
tions from opposition parties, the Defense 
Guideline-related Bills passed in the Japanese 
Diet on May 24, 1999 and took effect on May 
28. The package included three bills authoriz-
ing the JSDF to take various measures in 
times of emergencies in areas surrounding 
the territory of Japan, to amend the Self De-
fense Law, and to revise the Japan-U.S. Acqui-
sition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA). 
　During the discussions of these bills and af-
ter their enactment, several Japanese com-
mentators expressed the view that the new 
guideline and its related laws would be sub-
stantially equivalent to the revision of the Ja-
pan-U.S. Security Treaty in the sense that Ja-
pan would be expanding its military activities, 
even if it were only logistical support, in order 
to reinforce U.S. military commitments in oth-
er parts of the regions. These laws ensured 
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very substantial changes in U.S.-Japan alliance 
relations from bilateral to global security ties 
and far beyond the spirit and political con-
straints of the Japanese Constitution.
　Japan’s post-war strategic posture based on 
as it were the “embedded defensive-defense 
doctrine” has been deeply interconnected 
with the nation’s “no more war” sentiment, 
namely with Japan’s embedded nature of paci-
fism.  However, it should be noted that those, 
who felt this re-alignment of the U.S.-Japan 
security relationship in line with post-Cold 
War circumstances as war-prone trends in Ja-
pan, had become a minority by that time, es-
pecially after the missile test launch by the 
DPRK on August 31, 1998. This was clearly 
seen in some public opinion polls, in which 
over half of the Japanese supported the De-
fense Guideline-related Bills.
　Contrary to such pacifist criticism, many 
commentators and politicians who fervently 
stressed more international contributions by 
Japan in the area of peace and stability mis-
sions in the military field, insisted enthusiasti-
cally on the development and deployment of 
reconnaissance satellites and the facilitation of 
a co-research and co-deployment program 
with the U.S. for the future deployment of the 
BMD system.
b)  Relaxing Arms Exports and the Military 
Use of Outer Space
　Japan refrains from pursuing most offensive 
military capabilities, including nuclear weap-
ons, though it has the technology and finance 
to do so. Despite possessing one of the world’s 
most advanced manufacturing bases, which 
produces the majority of weapons for Japan’s 
own SDF, Japanese firms export no weapons 
abroad.  Further, despite adhering to a “de-
fensive-defense” military posture, Japan’s stat-
ed policy regarding the use of outer space has 
precluded-until very recently-the use of mili-
tary surveillance satellites so as to balance its 
lack of offensive weapons capability, and even 
today its intelligence capabilities are quite lim-
ited and its activities highly constrained.
　The acceptance of the MD system caused 
Japan to relax the arms export restrictions 
and to open up the way for the military use of 
outer space. In 2008, there were some policy 
changes concerning the export of arms and 
the military use of outer space.
　Arms Export
　The export of arms and military technology 
has been banned since 1967, when Prime Min-
ister Eisaku Sato declared the Three Princi-
ples on Arms Export, which prohibited their 
export to the following countries: 1) Commu-
nist-bloc countries; 2) countries to which the 
export of arms is prohibited under United Na-
tions resolutions; 3) countries which are actu-
ally involved or likely to become involved in 
international conflicts.
　In 1976, the ban was strengthened. The 
then-Prime Minister Takeo Miki, who was 
known as a dove on security issues within the 
LDP, announced a new government policy 
guideline, which maintained the specific prohi-
bitions on arms exports to the three afore-
mentioned categories of states, and added a 
blanket prohibition on these, stating that 
“arms exports to other areas shall be avoided, 
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in conformity with the spirit of the Japanese 
Constitution and the Foreign Exchange Con-
trol Law.” Moreover, it adds “exports of arms 
production-related equipment…shall be dealt 
with in the same manner as arms.” The ban 
was reinforced in 1981 when both houses of 
Parliament passed resolutions supporting it.
　The United States did not advocate the re-
peal of Japan’s new blanket arms export ban 
but instead argued for exemptions for tech-
nology transfer only to be made in favor of 
the United States. In addition to American 
pressure, there were demands from Japanese 
industries for a change in Japan’s arms export 
policy. These three new principles on arms 
export was jeopardized by Prime Minister 
Yasuhiro Nakasone, who as a hawk on securi-
ty issues, sought to relax them. In Janu-
ary1983, the Japanese government issued new 
policy guidelines related to arms exports that 
allowed the transfer of technology to the Unit-
ed States. In November of the same year, the 
Military Technology Transfer Agreement 
was signed jointly by both Japan and the U.S.
　In December 2004, weapons component 
transfers related to MD were allowed for the 
United States, which further reduced the re-
strictions imposed by Japan.  In January 2008, 
the Japanese government announced that it 
would consider returning to the 1967 Three 
Principles on Arms Exports from that of the 
1976 agreement. The combination of excep-
tions for dual use and for the United States 
will undoubtedly allow for increased Japanese 
participation in weapons exports in the future.
　The Military Use of Outer Space
　Japan’s peaceful-use-of-space policy, which 
was adopted by a 1969 Diet resolution, is just 
one example of Japan’s pacifist or anti-milita-
rist foreign policy.  Unlike the case of arms 
export restrictions, however, the limiting of 
the use of outer space to peaceful purposes 
had little practical effect on Japan’s outer 
space development in the short term because 
it did not possess competitive technology in 
that field as it did in the area of arms manu-
facturing. The Peaceful Use of Space resolu-
tion was not directed only at the potential de-
velopment of surveillance satellites, but this 
use of space was one of the primary concerns 
of those opposed to its militarization.  The 
Diet resolution presented an institutionalized 
barrier to Japanese corporate and military use 
of space, rooted in the security identity of do-
mestic anti-militarism.8
　Only after the 1985 Plaza Accord-generated 
exchange rate reevaluations greatly increased 
the wealth of Japanese companies, and Japa-
nese technology had risen to a level competi-
tive with that of the United States on many 
levels, did the Japanese government and in-
dustry leaders seriously consider the industri-
al development of outer space. 
　By the mid-1980s, Japanese firms had be-
come convinced that successful development 
of space-related technology would be impera-
tive for the twenty-first century.
　After the test launch by the DPRK, as men-
tioned above, the government and the LDP im-
mediately decided to introduce reconnaissance 
satellites and the Government Committee for 
the Promotion of the Introduction of Reconnais-
sance Satellites was established anew.
　In December 1998, the government decided 
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to use outer space for military intelligence 
purposes with the intention of developing a 
network of domestically-produced and de-
ployed information-gathering satellites to be 
utilized by the JDA and the SDF in response 
to new security threats. 
　As far as the installation of these satellites 
is concerned, most politicians except for the 
Communists and the Social Democrats, have 
supported the legitimization and institutionali-
zation of these systems in the general frame-
work of Japan’s defense posture. In May 2008, 
they proposed to revise fundamentally the 
“Diet Resolution Relating to the Peaceful Use 
of Outer Space,” adopted in 1969 which, at 
that time, banned the military use of outer 
space. It was decided to enact a new law in 
order to monitor missile launches and keep 
reconnaissance satellites in outer space. 
　This bill finally passed on May 21, 2008, 
which stipulated that the use and develop-
ment of space be carried out in ways that 
would contribute to Japan’s security. This 
shows clearly a change in Japan’s basic policy 
on the peaceful use of space from a “non-mili-
tary” to a “non-aggressive” stance. This law 
also permitted the government to station 
equipment in outer space compatible with a 
“defensive-defense” purpose. 
　Throughout, Japan and the U.S. have often 
raised their anxieties about China’s ambitious 
attempts to expand its military activities in 
space. In 2006, the first launch of a Chinese 
manned satellite and a test launch of an anti-
satellite missile by its military with its success 
in January 2007, illustrate a rising perceived 
threat and a sense of insecurity towards the 
PRC by both the U.S. and Japan. The then-
Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates’ state-
ment, submitted to the Senate Appropriations 
Committee on May 20, 2008, shows very well 
this perceived threat in the US preponderant 
system of space weaponry posed by China: 
　The Defense Department’s heavy reliance 
on space capability is clear to potential adver-
saries, some of whom are now developing anti-
satellite weapons. Protecting our assets in 
space is, therefore, a high priority. In the past, 
the Department has been slow to address this 
vulnerability, but we are now addressing this 
problem properly.
　 It goes without saying that Japan’s military 
use of outer space is closely connected with 
the space policy of the U.S. China has per-
ceived this new security rearrangement be-
tween the U.S. and Japan as offensive rather 
than defensive, which has caused a security 
dilemma in North-East Asia. 
3 Thinking of Japan’s Security Policy
a) Analyzing Japan’s Security Practice
　For the past several years, many books on 
Japan’s recent security policy have been pub-
lished abroad. In Rethinking Japanese Security, 
P.J.Katzenstein writes that:
　Fifteen years ago, only area specialists 
were thinking about the question of Japanese 
security, and those questions were narrowly 
framed. A more fully theorized approach to 
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Japanese security has become more widely ac-
cepted. It has opened new analytical vistas 
that may encourage an exploration of new po-
litical possibilities at the very time that a more 
assertive and less certain Japan seeking to rec-
alibrate its politics in a changing world.9
　Among them, I sympathize with Andrew L. 
Oros, in his Normalizing Japan : Politics, Iden�
tity, and the Evolution of Security Practice,. 
Here, he sweeps away the fear that Japan is 
on the verge of a major break from the past 
sixty years of peaceful security practice or 
that it is being “normalized” into developing 
military capabilities and approaches in line 
with its great power status, with a careful ex-
amination of how security practices have 
evolved from the constructivist’s point of 
view. He writes that:
　Japanese military forces are still focused in 
Japan’s self-defense, still don’t engage in com-
bat activities abroad (even under UNPKO), and 
still face enormous obstacles to their actual de-
ployment. Japan still refrains from exporting 
weapons or developing nuclear weapons. The 
new Ministry of Defense still lacks the resourc-
es to develop a national strategy beyond short-
term targets (despite renewed interest and ef-
forts to do so) and has seen its budget actually 
decline in recent years despite a rebounding 
economy.
　More broadly, despite increasing security 
awareness among the Japanese public and elit-
es, increased evidence of strategic thinking 
and planning, and a broader scope of debate of 
once-taboo subjects, much debate is still con-
sumed with legalistic questions (･･･)Finally, 
any action on revising the linchpin of Japan’s 
postwar security identity-Article 9 of the post-
war  constitution - has now been foreclosed 
until 2010 at the earliest, and even then serious 
hurdles remain.10
　On the other hand, Richard J. Samuels in 
Securing Japan : Tokyo’s Grand Strategy and 
the Future of East Asia, illustrates how suc-
cessful Japanese leaders have been in the past 
in adapting a limited number of ideas and 
strategic concepts in mastering broad range 
international conditions and predicts Japan’s 
new grand strategy, which he calls the “Gold-
ilocks consensus, ” that will follow Meiji Ja-
pan’s “Rich Nations, Strong Army,” Konoe’s “ 
New Order,” and the “Yoshida Doctrine.” 
This consensus is “ not too hard but not too 
soft, not too Asian and not too Western and 
neither too dependent on the United States 
nor too vulnerable to China.”11
　Samuels suggests the possibility that Japan 
will run away from the United States’ control, 
seeking the twin rewards of autonomy and 
prestige. It is hard for me to imagine this. As 
Samuels suggests, the Japanese government 
has pursued consistently one of the basic 
principles of the “Yoshida Doctrine” namely, 
if anything, the inherently basic line for de-
pendence on the U.S. in both politico-military 
and economic terms.  It is no exaggeration to 
say that the post-war Japanese grand strate-
gy is affirmatively characterized as “America 
First” and “Asia Second.” Therefore, Japan, 
as a regional core state, is expected to play a 
crucial role in linking Asia to the U.S. in the 
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near future. Numerous scholars and analysts 
have already demonstrated the reasons why 
Japan will not, once again, become a great ri-
val multi-power in East Asia. Researches on 
how to build a future security community in 
East Asia are abundant.  Therefore, I dare to 
refer to an EU-Japan security cooperation. Eu-
rope is, at best, the third in Japan’s order of 
priority in terms of security matters.
b)  Thinking of the Future of a Japan-EU 
Security Cooperation
　During the Cold War, the European Com-
munity and Japan kept a low profile as far as 
security was concerned. Both were consid-
ered civilian powers that had in common the 
use of non-military means for addressing se-
curity interests. In the 1990s, the European 
security strategy and the Japanese security 
initiatives had a common ground, which was a 
human security approach. 
　As mentioned before, after the Gulf War, 
Japan began to participate in the UN PKO 
and assisted in the reconstruction of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, Kosovo.  The key factor for 
its participation was “human security.” The 
Japanese government’s stance has been favo-
rable to such a concept since 1998, when at 
that time the Japanese Prime Minister Keizo 
Obuchi promoted it. The reasons why the 
Japanese government adopted this human se-
curity concept were that first, it matched the 
liberal and “pacifist” public opinion of the Jap-
anese people and therefore, it was easy to get 
public support for any Japanese contribution 
to the world human security agenda; and sec-
ond, it was a reasonable and logical continua-
tion of the comprehensive security doctrine 
developed by Japanese politicians and schol-
ars in the 1970s. 
　Since the Kosovo crisis of 1999, the EU has 
actively conducted a policy aimed at building 
independent crisis management forces that 
would not depend on the US or NATO, which 
included both civilian and military compo-
nents.
　Since 1991, when Japan and the EC signed 
the Hague Declaration, of which its main prin-
ciple and goals were mutual cooperation in 
the area of security, security relations be-
tween both regions have been developing 
gradually. Both highlighted and stressed the 
significance of the following spheres of securi-
ty cooperation: 1) environment; 2) energy; 3) 
science and technology; 4) development assist-
ance; 5) conflict prevention and non-military 
crisis management. These areas are common 
points that could be developed in the future 
as a core of a European Union-Japan security 
partnership.
　The Japan-EU security relationship is not 
purely bilateral and involves cooperation with 
other multilateral structures, such as the UN, 
Asia Europe Meetings (ASEM), ARF, etc. 
Their concerns about security for one anoth-
er’s regions and the necessity for cooperating 
within multilateral structures can become fea-
tures of a Japan-EU security relationship.
4　Japan is still a Civilian Power
　Most Japanese are not keen to depart dra-
matically from policies, which have successful-
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ly prevented a single Japanese soldier from 
being killed in combat for over sixty years. I 
remember it was expected that the SDF 
would withdraw from the coalition led by the 
U.S. if even one Japanese soldier were to be 
killed in the 2003 Iraq War. Hence, the Japa-
nese government will always make its securi-
ty policy reflect public opinion. 
　Japan is still a civilian power. We cannot 
forget that it has not yet abandoned the em-
bedded “defensive-defense doctrine” in its 
own grand strategy, and that it has, therefore, 
pursued its own way of national security as a 
faithful and subordinate partner of the U.S.’s 
grand strategy. We, Japanese, need to under-
stand that civilian power is only viable in the 
shadow of U.S. pressure, domination, and mili-
tary power. As far as the autonomy and the 
prestige are concerned as Samuels points out, 
I, myself, have not yet seen an outstanding 
statesman (Jpn. genkun) similar to the Meiji 
leaders such as Saigo, Okubo, and Kido.  As 
time goes by, both the spirit and nature of the 
Japanese people are changing.  As Oros notes, 
“it is essential to have one’s view of Japan’s 
future on its enduring security identity, and 
ultimately, on Japanese citizens themselves-a 
people who have come to see their way of 
providing for society as sufficiently “normal” 
to last well into this new century.”12
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